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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation can be magical. In the face of seemingly insurmountable
differences, it can lead to productive resolutions far beyond what
litigation could ever produce.' In the hands of sophisticated practitioners
and in appropriate cases, it offers a means for participants to engage in
self-determination and more flexible conflict resolution.2 In light of how
well mediation can work, it has experienced explosive growth in all areas
of conflict, and in both private and court-connected contexts.3 There is,
nevertheless, a risk that mediators can be unskilled or, worse,
affirmatively damaging. This risk is endemic to all mediation but play out
in particularly troubling ways when low-income litigants participate in
mediation through court-annexed programs that have few resources,
high volume, and uncertain quality control.
There are a number of reasons why such a risk exists. There is little
consensus about how best to practice mediation. Mediators can and do
advocate a wide range of, and sometimes inconsistent, approaches to
mediation. The debate becomes foundational, even to the extent that
mediators claim that another style of mediation is not mediation at all.
This means that mediators do not agree about what the norms of their
profession are, and thus, do not agree about whether a mediator is
unskilled or not. Indeed, to the extent codes for mediators exist, such as
the Uniform Mediation Act4 and the Model Standards of Conduct for
1. For some compelling statements-perhaps hyperbolic-about the value of mediation,
see Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
937, 939, 945 (1997) (Mediation is a means "to continue to survive and evolve as a species.");
ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE
APPROACH TO CONFLICT 258 (rev. ed. 2005) (Mediation is "an essential positive force in
constituting human identity and shared meaning.").
2. This Article will use the term "participants" instead of "parties" when discussing
mediation. This is because mediation can and does take place prior to litigation or in matters in
which litigation is not appropriate or contemplated.
3. For a review of the array of matters that are the subject of mediation, see KIMBERLEE K.
KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 479-505 (3d ed. 2004). The growth has extended
internationally as well. TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS,
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 3 (2009) (noting the "worldwide" growth of
mediation).
4. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003).
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Mediators,5 they are not detailed because there is not consensus as to
what good mediation is. Moreover, confidentiality, while valuable, also
has unintended consequences of largely insulating mediations from
scrutiny.
The risk of poor mediation intensifies in settings where there are
large numbers of low-income litigants. These litigants often know
nothing about mediation, may face more powerful litigants, and, in almost
all cases, have no legal counsel. The lack of an effective means to assess
quality in such a setting creates a risk that such participants will not only
fail to experience the many benefits that good mediation can offer, but
instead experience the negative consequences that bad mediation can
generate.
This Article traces these interlocking circumstances as a means to
explore the risks faced by low-income mediation participants. The Article
first explores the range of issues that have impeded a unified
understanding of the professional norms and identities of mediators.
Second, the Article defines bad mediation and the particular vulnerability
low-income litigants face in the context of high-volume court-annexed
programs. The Article concludes with recommendations about how best
to minimize the risk of bad mediation, with a particular emphasis on
insuring quality mediation for low-income litigants.
A note before continuing: the Article speaks of the "risk" of bad
mediation, and does so for a reason. It is misleading to paint mediators
who engage in important work in court-annexed programs as mostly bad
or unskilled. This is not only unfair, but inaccurate. Most are effective
mediators and perform this work-often for little or no compensation-
out of a commitment to extend the benefits of mediation to individuals
who otherwise could not afford it Moreover, individuals who work in
court-annexed mediation programs perform remarkable work,
sometimes under difficult conditions. "Risk" is thus not meant to imply
that bad mediation is common. Nevertheless, even a few bad mediators
can do affirmative harm to a vulnerable population, and they can do this
harm with virtually no means to ameliorate the consequences or prevent
its recurrence. This is a risk worth minimizing, and that is the ultimate
goal of this Article.
11. DIVERGENT PROFESSIONAL IDENTITIES AMONG MEDIATORS
Any attempt to address "bad" mediation must begin with what is
5. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (AM. BAR ASS'N 2005).
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"good" mediation. Remarkably, the question is harder to answer than
might first appear.6 This section explores why.
A. Defining Professional Norms
Roscoe Pound defined a "professional" as someone who pursues
activities to fulfill the "chief purpose" of "traditions."7  Professionals
explicitly self-identify as adherents to such "traditions."8 While there are
subspecialties within professions, an accountant will still self-identify as
an accountant, a lawyer as a lawyer, and so on.
In contrast, the majority of mediators come to mediation from other
professions, such as law, social work, mental health, accountancy, and the
clergy.9 Most mediators, therefore, see being a mediator as a "secondary
profession."10 For example, a lawyer may mediate, but would still
currently practice law and thereby continue to be subject to ethical rules
6. The efforts that have been undertaken in this regard remain unsuccessful. Art
Hinshaw, Regulating Mediators, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 163, 204-05 (2016) (discussing the
"struggles" and "difficulties" that characterize efforts to define mediation).
7. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 4-8 (1953).
8. Id.
9. See Brian Jarrett, Exploring and Practising Integral Mediation, 6 DISP. RESOL. INT'L 37, 43
(2012) (noting that mediation practitioners are from "divergent disciplines of origin, such as
law, social work, social work, psychology, counseling, sociology[,] and business"); Hinshaw,
Regulating Mediators, supra note 6, at 172 ("[P]eople typically come to mediation ... after being
educated and employed in another field."). The range of professionals who mediate reflect the
nature of particular mediations. For example, given the emotional concerns that often
accompany family dissolution, mental health professionals are commonly family law mediators.
Debra Berman & James Alfini, Lawyer Colonization of Family Mediation: Consequences and
Implications, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 893-94 (2012) ("[M]any mediators in court-connected
settings are still mental health professionals."). There are, nevertheless, programs that offer
degrees in dispute resolution. These include: University of Baltimore (offering a Masters in
Negotiations and Conflict Management (Negotiations and Conflict Management, UNIVERSITY OF
BALTIMORE, http://www.ubalt.edu/cpa/graduate-programs-and-certificates/degree-
programs/negotiations-and-conflict-management/ [https://perma.cc/36VW-JYZ4])); and
Pepperdine School of Law (offering a Master of Dispute Resolution (Learn about the Straus
MDR at Pepperdine, PEPPERDINE SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.pepperdine.edu/request-
information-straus-mdr/ [https://perma.cc/DS5D-UU9B])).
10. See Art Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse: Preserving
Mediation's Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 290 (2007) ("[M]ediation is a secondary
profession for most mediators."). The diversity of professional backgrounds of mediators is
consistent with the interdisciplinary history of mediation. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and
Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1 (2000).
Menkel-Meadow notes that mediation is "an eclectic field intellectually" which has drawn "not
only from law and legal theory, but from anthropology, sociology, international relations, social
and cognitive psychology, game theory and economics, and most recently, political theory." Id.
at 3.
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that apply to that profession."
B. The "Models" Debate
In addition, and related to the lack of uniformity of professional
identity of mediators, there has been a robust-sometimes heated-
debate about the proper approach to mediation. These are usually
referred to as "styles" or "models" of mediation.12 The debate originates
from influential work by Leonard Riskin, who proposed a "grid" of
mediator orientations comprised of what came to be known as
"facilitative mediation" and "evaluative mediation."13 A more recent
addition to the grid-and one that is almost universally recognized as a
distinct model-is "transformative mediation."14 These three models are
so embedded in the literature of mediation that they have been called
"the big three."'5 The models debate shows that what is "competent"
mediation is a loaded question, because, to many, what model a mediator
adheres to defines what is competent or not.
11. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct reflect the risks in eliding professional
boundaries when lawyers act as mediators. The Rules mandate that when "a party does not
understand the lawyer's role [as a third-party neutral] in the matter, the lawyer shall explain
the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and the lawyer's role as one
who represents a client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.4 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2016).
12. The following discussion assumes that mediators follow only one approach, but in
fact, it is common for mediators to be pragmatic, incorporating a range of "models" consciously
or subconsciously as circumstances warrant See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of
the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL. 247, 248 (2000).
13. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES
To HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 51 (1996). Despite
its extraordinary success, or perhaps because of it, Professor Riskin himself has subsequently
expressed reservations about how his "grid" has come to be used. Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (2003).
14. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 1, at 1. There are other named approaches to mediation in
the literature. See KENNETH R. MELCHIN & CHERYL A. PICARD, TRANSFORMING CONFLICT THROUGH
INSIGHT 43 (2008); JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEw APPROACH TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2001). For a discussion of commonalities of these approaches with other
models of mediation, see Cheryl Picard & Janet Siltanen, Exploring the Significance of Emotion
for Mediation Practice, 31 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 31, 33-34 (2013).
15. Dorothy J. Della Noce, Evaluative Mediation: In Search of Practice Competencies, 27
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 193, 195 (2009). While this Article adopts the almost universal distinctions
among these approaches, some have noted that they simplify debates about what these
approaches mean. Lorig Charkoudian et al., Mediation by Any Other Name Would Smell as
Sweet-Or Would It? The Struggle to Define Mediation and Its Various Approaches, 26 CONFLICT




What follows is a brief discussion of the three models of mediation.
1. Evaluative Mediation
Evaluative mediators assume an active role in mediation.16 Such
mediators "make assessments about the conflict as well as its resolution
and communicate those assessments to the parties."17  Evaluative
mediators seek to offer a "neutral" view about likely outcomes in
adjudication or whether an agreement is, in a more general sense, "fair."18
In so doing, this model assumes that a mediator can, and should, make
meaningful assessments about the legal merits of different positions and
that mediators can and should act as finders of fact.19  Many
commentators have noted that evaluative mediation, with its overtones
of litigation, is litigation or a "settlement conference" under another
name.20
2. Facilitative Mediation
Facilitative mediators hold that participants are experts on their lives,
conflicts, and relationships.21 Participants are thus best equipped to
define their own conflicts and determine how best to resolve them.22
Under this view, evaluative mediation is inappropriate because
16. Tracey S. Wiltgen, Different Models of Mediation: Finding the Right Fit?, 8 HAW. B. J. 35
(2004) ("Consequently, the evaluative mediator plays a[n]... active role in the substantive
nature of the conflict and the agreements that are reached.").
17. L. Randolph Lowry, Evaluative Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 73 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 2004).
18. Scott H. Hughes, Facilitative Mediation or Evaluative Mediation: May Your Choice Be a
Wise One, 59 ALA. LAW. 246, 246-47 (1998).
19. See Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of
Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 848 n.65 (2004) ("In contrast, an evaluative
mediator may suggest and argue in favor of certain solutions, may assess the strength of a
parties' legal or non-legal position, and may predict what will happen if the parties do not reach
a mediated settlement.").
20. See generally Love, supra note 1. James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out:
Is This the End of Good Mediation?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV., 47, 50 (1991) (Lawyers or retired
judges acting as mediation bring a litigation mindset to mediation, thereby portending "the end
of good mediation."). One study, however, found that once immersed in mediation, some
lawyer-mediators tend to move away from a strictly legal mindset RELIS, supra note 3, at 17-
18.
21. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 13.
22. Leonard Riskin, for example, notes that a "facilitative mediator assumes the parties
are intelligent, able to work with their counterparts, and capable of understanding their
situations better than either their lawyers or the mediator.... [T]he facilitative mediator
assumes that his principal mission is to enhance and clarify communications between the
parties in order to help them decide what to do." Id at 111.
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evaluating legal positions, defining issues, or assessing the fairness of
proposed resolutions disempowers parties-the antithesis of what
mediation should be about.
An important characteristic of facilitative mediation is that facilitative
mediators tend not to dwell on the past.2 3 While in litigation "fact finders
. . . are historians, examining 'evidence' to predict what happened,"24
facilitative mediators encourage a forward-looking orientation. They
seek to "shift attention from retrospective positions and accounts to
prospective stories, effectively disconnecting the problem from its
history."25 As a result, "facts" are defined by mediation participants, and
what facts are "relevant" is a decision made by participants.26
Adherents of the "facilitative" model heatedly criticize evaluative
mediation.27 They argue, among other things, that evaluators promote an
adversarial process indistinguishable from litigation, and thus, are not
real mediators.28
3. Transformative Mediation
Transformative mediators assume an even less active role than a
facilitative mediator.29 Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph A. Folger, the
founders of transformative mediation,30 characterize transformative
mediation as follows:
The mediation process contains within it a unique
23. Robert Rubinson, Of Grids and Gatekeepers: The Socioeconomics of Mediation, 17
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 873, 879 (2016).
24. Id.
25. Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality as a Discursive Practice: The Construction and
Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation, in 11 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 69, 71 (Austin
Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1991). This, however, is not an absolute rule: most facilitative
mediators acknowledge that exploration of the past, and the corresponding catharsis that
might arise from that exploration, can be an integral part of mediation. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 162-69, 182
(3d ed. rev. 2003).
26. For an extended discussion of this idea, see Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World:
Facts and Meaning in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REV. 61, 78-82 (2010).
27. Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of
Therapeutic jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 155, 163-68 (1998) (discussing the
evaluative/facilitative debate).
28. Love, supra note 1, at 937-38. Love argues that an evaluative process needs to be
"properly advertised" and "accurately labeled." Id. at 948.
29. Wiltgen, supra note 16 ("A transformative model is much less structured than the...
facilitative model[ ... , and focuses solely on opening and improving communication between
the parties.").




potential for transforming conflict interaction and, as a
result, changing the mindset of people who are involved in
the process. This transformative potential stems from
mediation's capacity to generate two important dynamic
effects: empowerment and recognition. In simplest terms,
empowerment means the restoration to individuals of a
sense of their value and strength and their own capacity
to make decisions and handle life's problems. Recognition
means the evocation in individuals of acknowledgment,
understanding, or empathy for the situation and views of
the other.... [P]arties are helped to transform their
conflict interaction-from destructive to constructive-
and to experience the personal effects of such
transformation.31
As suggested by this description, settlement is not the goal of
transformative mediation. While settlement might be a byproduct of the
process, it is just that: a byproduct. Bush and Folger repeatedly stress
this idea as a foundational dimension of transformative mediation.32
Moreover, as opposed to facilitative mediators, transformative
mediators do not encourage participants to look to the future, or to
brainstorm, or to problem-solve, or to focus on "interests" rather than
"positions"-that is, the norms of facilitative mediation.33 Rather, a "goal"
of transformative mediation, if it can even be characterized as such, is
embedded in the name "transformative": the quality of participants'
interaction will be transformed in a positive way.3 4 There is one primary
basis to promote such transformation: "to follow the parties wherever
they may decide to go next."35
4. Other Models.
Although less cited than the "big three," other models of mediation do
exist. Two examples are "insight mediation"3 6 and "narrative
mediation."37 There are substantial points of agreement with these two
models and with, in particular, transformative mediation, albeit with
31. Id. at 22-23 (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 87.
33. Id. at 217.
34. Id. ("[T]he mediator assists the parties in clarifying and decidingfor themselves what
they consider a successful resolution.") (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 184.
36. See MELCHIN & PICARD, supra note 14, at 76.
37. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 14.
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different emphases in the roles mediators undertake.38 These other
models suggest an ongoing impulse to carve out distinct approaches-a
sign of continuing dissatisfaction with existing definitions of mediation.
5. The Impact of the Models Debate
The crux of the models debate, then, is that there is no consensus
about how to conduct mediation39 or, even at the most fundamental level,
what its goals are.40
C. Of Mediation Codes
Mediation codes themselves reflect the divergence of opinions as to
what is an appropriate "model" of mediation. The following offers an
overview of why this is the case.
1. Ethics Codes Outside of Mediation
Ethics codes exist for virtually all professions. Examples include
law,4 ' medicine,42 accountancy,43 social work,44 nurse anesthetists,45
audiologists,4 6 realtors,47 and many others.48 While some critique these
38. For a discussion of these commonalities, see Picard & Siltanen, supra note 14.
39. For an example that starkly demonstrates this lack of consensus, see Love, supra note
1, at 940 (arguing that "evaluation is antithetical to the goals of mediation").
40. Hinshaw, Regulating Mediators, supra note 6, at 175 ("[Allmost anything a mediator
does can be explained by one or more competing mediation theories.").




42. CODE OF MED. ETHICS (AM. MED. AsS'N 2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/about-
us/code-medical-ethics [https://perma.cc/6LKN-G2GT].
43. CODE OF ETHICS FOR PROF. ACCT. (INT'L FED'N ACCT. 2006),
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/fles/ifac-code-of-ethics-for.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CL8-JJBW].
44. CODE OF ETHICS (NAT'L Ass'N Soc. WORKERS 2008),
https://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/default.asp [https://perma.cc/SE4L-DUT4].
45. CODE OF ETHICS FOR THE CERTIFIED REGISTERED NURSE ANESTHETIST (AM. AsS'N NURSE
ANESTHETISTS 2005).
46. CODE OF ETHICS (AM. ACAD. AUDIOLOGY 2016), http://www.audiology.org/publications-
resources/document-library/code-ethics [https://perma.cc/5UUZ-H2QH].
47. CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRAC. (NAT'L Ass'N REALTORS 2017),
https://www.nar.realtor/about-nar/governing-documents/the-code-of-ethics
[https://perma.cc/EP6F-9ELW].
48. Other examples include actuaries (CODE OF PROF. CONDUCT (AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES 2001),
http://www.actuary.org/files/code-oLconduct.8-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG55-CRK8]);
cosmetologists (CODE OF ETHICAL PRAC. (PROF'L BEAUTY Ass'N), https://probeauty.org/pledge/
2017]1 1361
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codes as, at least in part, driven by self-interest,49 most codes have
elements that reflect bedrock norms of the professions they seek to
regulate. Examples include the following:
* Establish norms of the profession.50
* Establish rules or guidelines that describe acts that reflect or
violate these norms.51
* Require confidentiality.52
* Require avoidance of conflicts of interest.53
* Require competence.5 4
Another crucial characteristic of codes is that they address how to
identify and discipline practitioners who violate professional rules and
norms. In so doing, they provide a mechanism to censure a practitioner
or exclude a practitioner from continuing to practice the profession.55
[https://perma.cc/KB6J-5XX9]); and automobile technicians (CODE OF ETHICS (AUTOMOTIVE
SERVICE Ass'N), http://asashop.org/about/our-story/code-of-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/M2UN-
M6TE]). In addition, due to the mandate of the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, private organizations often
adopt individual codes. See Joshua A. Newbert, Corporate Codes ofEthics, Mandatory Disclosure,
and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253 (2005).
49. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 48 (1986) (noting critique of professional
codes of ethics as "the products of grasping and selfish motivations, based on anticompetitive
or class-based animus"); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX.
L. REv. 639, 654 (1981) ("[E]thical rules contribute to market control" by lawyers.); WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 164 (1998) (Professional
associations and ethical norms "are both historically and structurally disposed toward more
than occasional narrow self-interest.").
50. IAN FRECKELTON, Enforcement of Ethics, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 131
(Margaret Coady & Sidney Bloch eds., 1996).
51. Id.
52. The origin of a professional duty of confidentiality extends back at least to the original
text of the Hippocratic Oath from 5th Century BCE. The original text is as follows: "[W]hat I
may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the
life of men, which on no account one must spread about, I will keep to myself holding such
things shameful to be spoken about." Bernard Friedland, HIV Confidentiality and the Right to
Warn-The Health Care Provider's Dilemma, 80 MASS. L. REV. 3 (1995).
53. LOANE SKENE, A Legal Perspective on Codes of Ethics, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE
PROFESSIONS, 125-26 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Bloch eds., 1996).
54. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
55. FRECKELTON, supra note 50, at 130, 135. For a comparison of the enforcement of
ethical codes for a number of professions in Canada, see Shankar A. Yelaja & Colleen MacMillan,
Enforcement of Professional Ethics: A Comparative Study of Medicine, Nursing, Psychology and
Social Work in Ontario, Research Paper Series No. 8464 (Wilfrid Laurier University 1983).
Engaging in the unauthorized practice of a profession is often a crime. Grace M. Giesel,
Corporations Practicing Law through Lawyers: Why the Unauthorized Practice of Law Doctrine
Should Not Apply, 6S Mo. L. REV. 151, 165 (2000) ("[M]any states have statutes making the
unauthorized practice of law a crime."); Michael H. Cohen, Holistic Health Care: Including
Alternative and Complementary Medicine in Insurance and Regulatory Schemes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
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There are numerous examples: CPAs,s6 physicians,57 psychologists,s8 and,
of course, lawyers.59
While not all codes contain all of the enumerated elements, some have
all and all have some.
2. Mediation Codes in the Absence of Professional Identity
Mediation codes are both consistent with and differ from most other
codes in important ways. While there is a sense that a mediator need not
leave other professional expertise at the door of the mediation room,6 0 a
mediator, when acting as a mediator, is a mediator, and not, say, a lawyer
or accountant.61  This brings home yet another dimension of the
complexity of the role of mediators: in addition to a lack of a consensus
about what mediation is, there is a lack of consensus about what
expertise a mediator should have.62 Put another way, codes typically
embody a set of norms established through professional consensus;
consensus, however, has eluded the community of mediators due to, as
83, 90 (1996) ("Each state... makes the unlicensed practice of medicine a crime.").
56. George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before and
After Enron, 52 EMORY L. J. 1325, 1345 (2003) (noting that discipline of accountants can be
undertaken by state accounting boards, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
American Institute of CPAs).
57. Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 285 (2010).
58. Professional Licensing, Certification & Discipline, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 423 (1996); Barbara A. Van Horne, Psychology Licensing Board Disciplinary Actions: The
Realities, 35 PROF'L PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 170 (2004).
59. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
Ethics-II The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 217 (2002). The American Bar
Association has also issued standards that focus specifically on the disciplinary process. ABA
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAW. SANCTIONS (AM. BAR Ass'N 1992); ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAW.
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
60. "A mediator may provide information that the mediator is qualified by training or
experience to provide, but only if the mediator can do so consistent with these standards."
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI (AM. BAR Ass'N 2005). The Standards
go on to say that when a mediator assumes the role of another professional, the sometimes
mediator "assumes different duties and responsibilities ... governed by other standards." Id
61. The Model Standard of Conduct for Mediators offers words of warning about
intermingling professional roles: "The role of a mediator differs substantially from other
professional roles. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of another professional is
problematic and thus, a mediator should distinguish between the roles." Id.
62. Debates about "qualifications" reflect disagreements about the requisite expertise,
experience, and education a mediator must or should have in order to mediate. Bobby Marzine
Harges, Mediator Qualifications: The Trend Toward Professionalization, 1997 BYU L. REV. 687
(1997) ("One of the most controversial issues in the... [ADR] field concerns mediator
qualifications.").
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discussed, the diverse professions from which mediators emerge.63
This lack of consensus has generated a set of ethics codes for
mediators characterized by vagueness.64  This is true even
internationally; one international group of ADR experts concluded that in
mediation, "only general principles for the regulation of dispute
resolution are desirable"6 5-a conclusion that transforms necessity into
desirability. Not surprisingly, the preeminent effort at a general code in
the United States governing the practice of mediation-the Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators-has been roundly criticized as being
too vague to be meaningful66 or even, as one commentator has put it,
"largely ignored."67
D. One Area of Consensus: Confidentiality
While ethics codes in mediation are usually vague, there is one
principle that is not: confidentiality.
Ethics codes, often in conjunction with other law, establish almost
ironclad confidentiality protections.68  There are legitimate and
important policy reasons why this is the case. Without confidentiality,
participants are less likely to fully engage in the mediation process,
thereby compromising its benefits.69 There is also the risk that mediation
will become a means for "free discovery," thus transforming mediation
into an adjunct to adjudication.70  Yet another reason is that
confidentiality protects mediators from being subpoenaed or sued for
63. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
64. Andrea C. Yang, Ethics Codes for Mediator Conduct: Necessary but Still Insufficient, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1237 (2009) ("Most criticism of the Model Standards" has focused "on
the substantive provisions' vagueness.").
65. FELIX STEFFEK ET AL., Guide for Regulating Dispute Resolution (GRDR): Principles, in
REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 5 (Felix Steffek &
Hannes Unberath eds., 2013).
66. See Yang, supra note 64.
67. Hinshaw, Regulating Mediators, supra note 6, at 205 (Mediators "routinely ignore" or
are completely unaware" of the Model Standards.).
68. A substantial number of states extend qualified or absolute immunity to mediators.
NAT'L STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS No. 14.0 (CENTER FOR DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, INST. OF JUD. ADMIN.) (reviewing state law on mediator immunity).
69. Eileen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System, 17
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 245 (2002) (Confidentiality encourages "forthright participation"
by mediation participants.).
70. Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal Government: Not Such Strange
Bedfellows After All, 66 Mo. L. REV. 709, 717 (2001) (quoting a lawyer who saw a benefit of
mediation as "[giving] us free discovery and insight into the plaintiffs position").
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malpractice.71 While this has an element of self-interest, there is a
legitimate concern that fewer professionals will become mediators if
there is a meaningful risk that they will be forced to testify in court or
sued by a party who questions their competence or ethics. Impeding the
growth of mediation would not be a helpful trend, especially given the
need for committed mediators for low-income litigants.72
Confidentiality, however, also has troubling consequences. It can be,
as one commentator has put it, "secret justice without accountability"
because there is little means to assess the quality of a given mediator or
mediation.73 In contrast, other professionals' malfeasance can, at least
sometimes, see the light of day. For example, most judicial proceedings
are public, and thus subject to scrutiny.74  Doctors, lawyers, and
accountants often produce a visible work product and interact with
others in performing services. A lawyer can miss a statute of limitations,
a doctor can fail to diagnose medical conditions, and an accountant can
file erroneous documents to state agencies. Such interactions pierce
confidentiality through "public" results, and thus operate as an
independent means to identify wrongdoing. These professionals, then,
can be and are subject to professional discipline or civil liability.75
Mediators, in contrast, are largely not subject to external scrutiny.76
While some states with court-annexed programs do have complaint
procedures,77 complaint procedures are largely ineffective with pro se
71. Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147 (2003) (tracing the rarity of
lawsuits against mediators and the reasons why this is the case). For an example of a case
which held that a mediator could not be subpoenaed to testify about whether a writing
accurately reflected an agreement reached in mediation, see Eisendrath v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 109 Cal. App. 4th 351 (2003). For a very rare example of a court finding
that a mediator can be called to testify, see McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d 806, 807, 809 (Fla.
Dist. Ct App. 1995) (Mediator must testify "about a claim that a written agreement should not
be enforced due to 'severe emotional distress,' duress,' and 'intimidation."').
72. For a discussion of the problems facing low-income litigants participating in court-
annexed mediation, see infra text accompanying notes 135-47.
73. MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 148 (Ellen Waldman ed., 2011) (quoting
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley).
74. See Alex Brauer & Tyng Loh,]udicial Misconduct, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 963 (2001).
75. This is not to say that mediators, necessarily, are particularly less committed to
excellence than other professionals, and there are incompetent, sometimes unscrupulous
practitioners in all professions. See Joshua Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIz. L. REV.
467, 468 (1991) (noting that while mediators can be "rude, insensitive, stupid and otherwise
incompetent," this is also true of physicians, judges, presidents, and schoolteachers).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 133-34.




participants who, among other challenges, have no base of knowledge to
assess-and thereby complain about-the quality of mediators.78
Moreover, given that there is no consensus about how mediation should
be practiced, it is difficult to develop a standard of care below which
there would be a breach.79 These impediments, among others,80 make it
close to impossible to prevail in a malpractice suit against a mediator,81
and few have even tried.82
III. BAD MEDIATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The vast majority of mediators are effective. To suggest otherwise
falls into the trap of criticizing a group of practitioners based solely on
bad actors, and bad actors are present in any profession.83 Nevertheless,
when it does happen, the consequences of bad mediation are substantial,
particularly given the vulnerabilities of the population most likely to bear
these consequences.84 It is thus crucial, albeit a challenge, to identify bad
mediation and minimize its occurrence, but it is certainly an attempt
worth making. While it is difficult-perhaps impossible -to determine
with specificity what "bad" mediation is, simply jettisoning any attempt
to do so means that mediation becomes a free for all. This would lead a
kind of mediation relativism where nothing is either good or bad.
A crucial step, then, is to decouple the "models debate" from
identifying and minimizing bad mediation. This assessment should not
be a function of whether a mediator follows a particular model or style.85
This is, for sure, a critical debate, and advocates on all sides argue
78. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34, 144-46.
79. Chang's Imports v. Srader, 216 F. Supp. 2d 325, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("There is almost
no law on what the appropriate standard of care is, if any, for a mediator who helps negotiate a
settlement between parties.").
80. For example, some states extend qualified immunity to mediators. Hinshaw,
Regulating Mediators, supra note 6, at 174-75.
81. Moffitt, Suing Mediators, supra note 71, at 150-53.
82. Id
83. Rosenberg, supra note 75. Rosenberg is responding to a critique of mediation by
Trina Grillo, who described troubling examples of mediation in which women were infantilized,
disempowered, and otherwise damaged. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). Rosenberg, supra note 75, argues that Grillo's
"appalling" stories are examples of bad mediators, not a demonstration that mediation itself is
bad.
84. See Grillo, supra note 83 (discussing how mandatory mediation can have
consequences for women and minorities).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 19-39.
1366 [100:1353
INDIGENCY, SECRECY, AND QUESTIONS OF QUALITY
passionately that the model they adhere to is the only "real" mediation.86
Nevertheless, protecting participants from bad mediation should not be a
means to carry out that long-simmering debate.8 7 To put it somewhat
differently, to many, adhering to the "wrong" model means a mediator is
"incompetent," but such reasoning inhibits the ability to identify truly bad
mediation. In any event, self-identification as a proponent of a particular
style does not mean that that the mediator follows this style in actual
mediations. Thus, for purposes of this Article, failing to adhere to a
particular "model" is not in and of itself "bad."
This Section, then, attempts to define "badness" in a way that should
be acceptable to evaluators, facilitators, and transformers, and to
mediators from a range of disciplines. It also attempts to do so without
descending into generalities that are only acceptable because they have
virtually no substantive content.
A. What Is Bad Mediation?
So what, then, is "bad" mediation? It is mediation that does harm-a
recapitulation of the Hippocratic Oath in the context of mediation.88 It is
thus not mediation that might not be very good or could be better.89 It is
much worse than that. Consider, for example, the following accounts of
mediators behaving badly: mediators have "trashed and bashed" to
promote-if not mandate-settlement;90 coerced mediation participants
into agreements because of personal convenience;91 offered bad or
86. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24, 31-33. Lela P. Love, for instance, is a
staunch proponent of facilitative mediation and offers a robust critique of evaluative mediation
as ill-conceived and adversarial adjudication under the guise of mediation, but she still notes
that these other models should be "accurately labeled"-an inference that other choices can be
legitimate if a participant knowingly chooses them. Love, supra note 1, at 948.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71. It is noteworthy that many practicing
mediators are not overly dogmatic on the "styles" debate and deploy strategies associated with
different styles given circumstances that might arise during a particular mediation. For a
discussion of such an "eclectic" approach, see, for example Stempel, supra note 12.
88. For a discussion of the Hippocratic Oath, see supra text accompanying note 55.
89. Improving mediation is often a goal of the mediation literature, but "improving"
usually presupposes a baseline of some measure of skill. The "models" debate can be seen in
this light. See supra text accompanying notes 12-60.
90. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out, supra note 20, at 66. Some mediators
actually believe that "a little bullying is really just part of how mediation works." Allen v. Leal,
27 F. Supp 2d 945, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
91. One court described the following in a mediation: "[Tihe mediator had repeatedly
stated that that his daughter was leaving for law school, and ... that 'you guys have five
minutes to hurry up and get out of here because that family is more important to me."' Vitakis-
Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Another allegation of
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misleading legal advice;92 and displayed blatant bias.93 Mediators have
"harangued" participants for "an hour and a half," 9 4 and exhibited
frustration by "throw[ing] papers on a table" and requesting "a strong
drink."95 One family mediator told a party that she was "young enough"
and "pretty enough" to get married "before the alimony runs out."96
There are also, sadly, examples of patent fraud and criminal behavior,
such as the mediator who charged $112,767 for mediating a divorce,
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (he had been disbarred in
the state in which the mediation took place), and made sexual advances
to one of the participants.97
These troubling examples are far outside the norm of any conception
of mediation. The examples become even more troubling when there is
what is called in the mediation literature a "power differential."98 Power
differentials manifest in many ways: one party may have superior
knowledge about circumstances underlying the conflict, have the
advantage of favorable law, possess something that is in dispute,99 and so
on. One particularly troubling power differential is when one mediation
participant is a victim of domestic violence and the other participant is
mediation misconduct is more about reputation: one mediator urged settlement because a
failure to do so "would ruin [the mediator's] record of being always able to settle" cases.
Patterson v. Taylor, 969 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
92. Yang, supra note 64, at 1229 (advising participants they have "zero chance of success"
in litigation).
93. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 83 (describing in detail a mediation in which a mediator
demonstrates bias against a female mediation participant in a family mediation).
94. Yang, supra note 64, at 1229-30.
95. Valchine, 793 So. 2d at 1097. The mediator also "declared" at one point in the
mediation "that's it, I give up," and threated to report to the judge that one party refused to
settle. Id
96. Paula M. Young, Take It or Leave It. Lump It or Grieve It: Designing Mediator Complaint
Systems that Protect Mediators, Unhappy Parties, Attorneys, Courts, The Process, and the Field, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 721, 722 (2006).
97. Art Hinshaw describes this unfortunate circumstance in Regulating Mediators, supra
note 6, at 164-67. When, at long last, one of the mediation participants refused to make a
payment, the mediator left "numerous voicemail messages," including one expressing "furious
threats of legal action." Id at 166-67.
98. As is typical, the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators is general on this point,
but still notes that a "mediator shall take appropriate steps including, if necessary...
terminating the mediation." MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI (AM. BAR
Ass'N 2005) (emphasis added). For an influential discussion of power differentials in
mediation, see Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359, 1387-91.
99. One common example, albeit an odd use of the term "possession," is when a child is in
custody of one parent.
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the abuser.100 Mediating with an abuser may place the victim at further
risk of physical harm or, more generally, revictimize the victimized.101
This not only subverts the goal of "empowerment" in mediation,102 but is
an exemplar of bad mediation. After all, in this circumstance, the very act
of mediating may be bad mediation because it has the potential to be
destructive or even dangerous.03
For purposes of this Article, a power differential of particular concern
relates to socioeconomics. Such a differential may happen, for example,
in a landlord tenant dispute, where a tenant-particularly a low-income
tenant-has, among other disadvantages, less knowledge of the law and
of legal procedure, faces a participant who is a "repeat player" in the
process,104 and is almost certainly pro se while the landlord has a
lawyer.05 A power differential based on socioeconomics might also
happen in a family or consumer disputes, or in foreclosure proceedings,
all of which are subject to mediation.06
Bad mediation, then, is when the mediation creates an actual or
potential physical or emotional harm. This risk is particularly troubling
when participants in mediation are low income. Court-annexed
mediation programs are the locus where most such mediations take
place, and it is to these programs that this Article now turns.
B. Court-Annexed Mediation
Courts have turned to court-connected mediation as a means to
resolve disputes.107 All fifty states'08 as well as the federal government'09
100. See, e.g., lane C. Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation:
Responding to the Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53 (2005); Nancy Ver
Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce Mediation in the Presence of
Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145 (2003).
101. Sarah Krieger, The Dangers of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO
WOMEN's L. J. 235 (2002); Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 100.
102. Barbara J. Hart, GentleJeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered and Children
in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317, 318, 321-22 (1990); Krieger, supra note 101, at 247.
8 CARDOZO WOMEN's L. J. 235 (2002); Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 100, at 56-57.
103. There remains an intense debate about whether mediating in the presence of
domestic violence is ever appropriate. The range of views extends from never to always,
although increasingly commentators have concluded that the answer is "it depends." See, e.g.,
Ver Steegh, supra note 100; Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 100.
104. The classic study of this idea is Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc. REV. 95, 97-98 (1974).
105. Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on the Black Box of Mediation: Should Mediators Make
Their Conduct More Transparent?, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 17 n.52 (1997).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 116-22.
107. SARAH COLE, CRAIG A. McEWEN, NANCY H. ROGERS, JAMES R. COBEN, PETER N. THOMPSON,
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have some form of court-connected mediation. "Public programs" offer
most of these mediations.110  Such programs have been subject to
scrutiny and critique."' The following two subsections generally
describe court-annexed programs and summarize some of the most
common critiques of many of these programs.
1. The Cases Low-Income People Mediate
The substance of court-annexed mediations in which low-income
people mediate reflects the types of cases low-income people litigate.112
These include bankruptcy,113 family law,114 landlord-tenant,115 debt
collection,116 and foreclosure.117 There are many of these cases,118 and, as
MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE Appendix A (2013-2014 ed., 2013); Russell Engler, And
Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the judges, Mediators,
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2007-09 (1999).
108. Court ADR Across the U.S., RESOLUTION SYSTEMS INSTITUTE'S ADR RESOURCE CENTER,
http://courtadr.org/court-adr-across-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/2H48-F63Z]; see also
Deborah R. Hensler, Our Court, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is
Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 185-88 (2003).
109. See, e.g., Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651-58 (1998)
(providing that "each United States District Court shall authorize... the use of alternative
dispute resolution processes in all civil actions"). 28 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1998).
110. Specific statistics on this point are hard to come by. What evidence there is,
however, does show an extremely large number of court-annexed mediations. Urska Velikonja,
Making Peace and Making Money: Economic Analysis of the Market for Mediators in Private
Practice, 72 ALB. L. REV. 257, 270 (2009) ("[A] large percentage of disputes, perhaps as many as
half, are mediated in free public programs.").
111. J. Brad Reich, A Call for Intellectual Honesty: A Response to the Uniform Mediation
Act's Privilege Against Disclosure, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 197, 226 (2001) (alluding to critiques of
mediation as "second class" justice); Mordehai (Moti) Mironi, Mediation v. Case Settlement: The
Unsettling Relations between Courts and Mediation-A Case Study, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 173,
199-204 (2014); Carol J. King, Burdening Access toJustice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation on the
Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375, 380 (1999).
112. This is not to suggest that the list that follows is exclusive. For example, some cases
ordinarily funded through contingent fees might not generate adequate fees to make it
worthwhile for attorneys to take them, and thus individuals must proceed pro se because they
cannot afford hourly fees. See Kristen M. Blankley, Adding by Subtracting: How Limited Scope
Agreements for Dispute Resolution Representation Can Increase Access to Attorney Services, 28
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 659, 660-61 (2013) (describing a personal injury matter too small to
generate minimal fees but would still pay, if successful, medical fees to the victim).
113. Nancy A. Welsh, You've Got Your Mother's Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can
Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
427, 441 (2009).
114. King, supra note 111.
115. Drake Zimmerman, Representation in ADR and Access to Justice for Legal Services
Clients, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 181 (2003).
116. These are sometimes euphemistically called "resolution conferences." Peter A.
Holland, junk justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 27 LOY.
1370 [100:1353
INDIGENCY, SECRECY, AND QUESTIONS OF QUALITY
a result, a primary goal of court-annexed mediation is docket control.119
This point has been made by numerous judges,120 scholars,121
administrators of mediation programs,122 and mediators themselves.123
The impact of "freeing" court time through mediation has been the
subject of empirical study 24 and employed as a means to assess the
success of court-annexed programs.125
2. Mediators in Court-Annexed Programs
Both individually and systemically, the quality of mediation in court-
CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 195 (2014).
117. This has been a particularly growing area for mediation. Lydia Nussbaum, ADR's
Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
1889, 1891 (2013).
118. See generally Rubinson, Of Grids and Gatekeepers, upra note 23.
119. Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR-A Time of Crisis, a Time of Change, 95 MARQ. L.
REV. 993, 1004-05 (2012); Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 241, 249 (2006) (noting how court-annexed mediation "can reduce cost and
delay for significant percentages of litigants").
120. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) ("[I]n an ideal world, we might prefer to allocate all necessary resources to public
adjudication of civil disputes, [but] we live in a world of ever expanding court dockets and
limited judicial resources.").
121. See, e.g., Will Pryor, What's Wrong with Mediation These Days, and How Can We Fix
It?, 32 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 71 ("[S]ome courts have become addicted to mediation
referral as a means of docket control."); Kathleen M. Scanlon, A Case forJudicialAccountability:
When Courts Add a Settlement Detour to the Traditional Appellate "Path," 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 379, 413 (2002) (Federal "circuit courts are managing their dockets in part by using
court mediation programs."); Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts:
Progress, Problems, and Possibilities, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 327, 335 (2003) ("[A]s more and more
courts have embraced mediation, they have done so primarily based on the promise of
increased efficiency: the promise that mediation would reduce court dockets, increase
settlement rates, and speed up case processing.").
122. How To Prevent Mediation from Running Aground-Also: Busting Myths About What
Arbitrators Do, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST. LITIG. 3, 7 (2005) (quoting a "senior settlement
attorney" for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as saying that "appeals court mediation
programs exist for docket control purposes").
123. Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the
End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAMILY CT. REV. 371, 378 (2009) (quoting a mediator in court-
connected mediation who describes that the "expectations of their workplace" are to deliver
settlements in a "fraction of the time required to effectively do so").
124. Judge Charles E. Clawson, The Use ofMediation in the 20th District, 40 ARK. LAw. 27, 28
(2005) (calculating that "mediation assisted settlement" succeeded in freeing "12 days" to
handle other cases in the court's docket).
125. Judith V. Caprez & Micki A. Armstrong, A Study of Domestic Mediation Outcomes With
Indigent Parents, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 415, 425 (2001) (assessing success of court-annexed
mediation through the number of settlements); Engler, supra note 107, at 2031-32 ("Reports of




annexed programs can be high but also variable.126 Although individual
mediators differ in skill and sophistication, many are excellent.
Nevertheless, even some mediators who are "experienced" might have
long practiced mediation that would appall skilled observers whatever
their mediation "style": they might not be fully, or even-partially, versed
in techniques of good mediation.127 Other mediators are on court rosters
not due to the quality of their mediation skills, but to gain experience
before building a private mediation practice or due to longstanding
relationships with judges or other court personnel.128 Mediators can also
continue to mediate in court-annexed programs with little or no scrutiny,
especially given that, as discussed above,129 the confidentiality of
mediation insulates mediators from observation by the court or others.130
There is another core issue that makes low-income litigants especially
vulnerable to bad mediators: they cannot afford lawyers.131 Without an
126. James Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation is Institutionalized?: To the Parties,
Practitioners, and Host Institutions, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 307, 312 (1994) (quoting Carol
Liebman that "[i]t is difficult to maintain quality when you get mediators... who are doing a
number of [mediations] every day, with little or no supervision," and without "the input and
check of a co-mediator").
127. See supra text accompanying notes 92-101 (describing examples of "bad"
mediation). This problem flows into the larger questions of what qualifications a mediator
should have in order to mediate. There is no consensus as to such qualifications. Timothy
Lohmar, et al., Student Project, A Survey of Domestic Mediator Qualifications and Suggestions for
a Uniform Paradigm, 1998 J. Disp. RESOL. 217; W. Lee Dobbins, The Debate over Mediator
Qualifications: Can They Satisfy the Growing Need to Measure Competence Without Barring Entry
into the Market?, 7 U. OF FLA. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 105-06 (1995).
128. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes ofIts Own: Conflicts
Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1871, 1925 (1997) (referring to court mediators
who "are generally untrained and placed on a court roster because of their litigation experience
or activity in bench or bar activities").
129. See supra text accompanying notes 77-86.
130. A good example is the difficulty in establishing mediator wrongdoing or overreach
through a judicial process. For an extended discussion of a troubling mediation and challenges
in seeking redress in court, see Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L. Q. 177 (1994); see also Nancy A. Welsh, The
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 86 (2001) (alluding to "the difficulty of protecting
the confidentiality of communications and conduct occurring during a mediation session when
the court must determine whether a mediator ... engaged in undue influence.").
131. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 170-71 (2012) ("Nearly a million cases ...
were rejected by legal-aid programs owing to insufficient resources."). See also DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 5 (2004) ("In most family, housing, bankruptcy, and small claims
courts, the majority of litigants lack representation."). The lack of an attorney in litigation
carries through to mediation as well. Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution:
Rethinking a Paradigm, 37 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 381, 384 (2010) ("[Tlhe reality is that
participants often do not or cannot retain counsel.").
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attorney, litigants do not know what to expect in mediation,132 which, in
turn, inhibits their ability to take advantage of what mediation has to
offer.33 Moreover, the lack of an attorney can be damaging, if not
catastrophic, when there are power differentials13 4 because lawyers can
act to enhance the power of an otherwise disempowered mediation
participant.13s The lack of an attorney becomes even more dangerous
when only one party is represented, 136 which is typical in the cases low-
income litigants usually mediate.137
Moreover, low-income litigants have no choice about who will
mediate their cases.138 "Buyers" of the services of private mediators can
reward mediators by referring them to others, including lawyers.139 In
contrast, low-income litigants have no power to choose their mediator,
and thus must take what they are given.140
In addition, given their lack of mediation experience, low-income
participants will rarely be able to assess, let along communicate about,
the quality of the mediation in which they participate. While some
studies suggest that the quality of court-annexed mediation is no worse
than non-court-annexed mediation,141 identifying "bad" mediators is
132. The National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs recognizes that
pro se litigants who participate in mediation "are often vulnerable to pressure to settle and to
accept unfair esults." NAT'L STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS No. 14.0 §
1.4 (CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, INST. OF JUD. ADMIN.).
133. Blankley, supra note 112, at 670-71 (2013) (noting that "pro se litigants are less
likely to understand" mediation).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 102-10; see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff &
Tom R. Tyler, Procedural justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 16 ("[Plower differentials may mean that mediation is simply
an inappropriate forum for some subset of cases in which the potential for party coercion
dictates that individual rights cannot be adequately protected.").
135. Craig McEwen, et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to
Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1339 (1995) (alluding to "the
view that lawyer advocacy helps balance power in cases of abuse").
136. Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship-A Legal Crisis
and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 47 (2011).
137. As noted supra at 124, these are common areas where low-income litigants
participate in court-annexed mediation.
138. Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with
Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
573, 603-04 (2004) (individual litigants do not have power to choose the model a mediator
adheres to).
139. Id.
140. STEFFEK ET AL., supra note 65, at 25, 53 (alluding to particular need for "ensuring the
neutrality and qualification of the intermediary" when there is a lack of "initiation control"
among participants).
141. For a collection of authorities reaching this conclusion, see RELIS, supra note 3, at 65-
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much harder in the court-annexed context when disputants do not have
lawyers because lawyers are in a better position to recognize bad
mediation and possibly ameliorate the consequences.142
Finally, bad mediation might not be a function of the mediators at all,
but of a flawed system in which they mediate. Consider the following
experiences of court-connected mediators:
[M]any court-connected mediators ... express enormous
frustration at being caught between a rock and a hard
place as they are asked to deliver high quality mediation
services in what they know to be a fraction of the time
required to effectively do so, often with cases that are not
appropriate for mediation. According to one veteran
court mediator who requested anonymity, "In recent
years, encouraging families toward self-determination
and private ordering have taken a back seat. Mediation
services, which are mandated, are adversely affected
because administrators move their workforce toward
evaluation services." Another mediator and court services
supervisor... said, "The process is called mediation and
we settle cases, but it certainly isn't real mediation."143
IV. ENHANCING MEDIATOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Thus far this Article has traced the challenges of defining what is
"good" or "bad" in mediation, the importance of meeting that challenge,
and the special risks that "bad" mediation holds for low-income
mediation participants. The question, now, is how best to meet these
challenges by examining current efforts to do so and proposing
alternatives.
Figure 1 offers a means to structure how to approach this challenge.
Note that Figure 1 is not meant to be taken literally. It is, rather, a tool to
organize the discussion that follows.
FIGURE 1
67.
142. Most studies involve represented parties, and thus the issues identified in this Article
are attenuated if not eliminated. Id.
143. Salem, supra note 123; see also Welsh, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 138, at
589 ("[C]ourt-connected mediators are unlikely to act as wholly disinterested parties who view
their role as purely facilitative."); James Alfini et al., What Happens When Mediation Is
Institutionalized?, supra note 126, at 310 (quoting Robert Baruch Bush as noting how a
"directive model of practice seems to be quite predominant" in court-connected contexts).
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POTENTIAL STAGES TO MINIMIZE "BAD" MEDIATION
PRIOR TO ENTRY (QUALIFICATIONS)
POINT OF ENTRY (CERTIFICATION OR LICENSURE)
DURING PRACTICE (CONTINUING EDUCATION/OBSERVATION)
INVESTIGATION (DISCIPLINARY PROCESS)
A. Qualifications
While not all states require licensure for both "public" and "private"
mediators, virtually all states establish a set of necessary qualifications
for mediators who practice in certain settings.144 States also impose
additional requirements to mediate specific categories of cases,
particularly family law,145 but other types of cases as well.146 Virtually all
such qualifications require a defined number of hours spent in training,
an academic degree, and observations or co-mediations with experienced
mediators.147
The goal of qualification requirements for all professions is that
fulfilling them will produce competent, ethical practitioners. This is a
questionable proposition when it comes to mediation. Mediator
qualifications tend to be of the "check off box" variety. For example, if an
applicant has completed training requirements, holds the requisite
academic degree, and fulfills observation requirements, the mediator is,
by definition, deemed qualified.148 Consider how problematic this is in
the context of two of the most common qualifications required of
mediators: hours of training and degree requirements.
As to training, virtually all states require an aspiring mediator-
particularly in court-annexed programs-to take a set number of hours of
mediator training.4 9 Completion of the training is all that is required.
144. Dana Shaw, Mediation Certification: An Analysis of the Aspects of Mediator
Certification and an Outlook on the Trend ofFormulating Qualifications for Mediators, 29 U. TOL.
L. REV. 327 (1998).
145. Lohmar et al., supra note 127.
146. Maryland, for example, has such additional qualifications for "Business and
[t]echnology cases," "[h]ealth care and malpractice claims," and "[f]oreclosure cases." See, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., MD Rules § 17-205 (West 2017).
147. See Marzine Harges, supra note 62.
148. Norma Jeanne Hill, Qualification Requirements of Mediators, 1998 J. DIsP. RESOL. 37,
40.
149. Id. ("[T]raining is... a somewhat universal requirement before one can mediate"
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Completion, however, is fundamentally distinct from an assessment of
whether the trainee has even minimally mastered what is being taught.
There is rarely a summative assessment of an attendee's performance.150
An attendee might have mastered nothing, or even, to put it in terms of
this Article, the attendee might demonstrate indicia of becoming a "bad"
mediator. Indeed, studies have tended to confirm that there is no
correlation between training and the quality of a mediator who was
trained.151 The training "box" will nevertheless be checked.
Another deficiency of training requirements relates to the quality of
the training itself. Statutes often specify the required content of the
training, 152 but few establish mechanisms to assess their quality.53 It is
possible that a training program can be taught by "bad" mediators, which
increases the risk that the trainees themselves will become the same.154
Such a lack of quality control is in stark contrast to other professions
which adopt an accreditation process before professional schools can
offer courses to fulfill requirements necessary for certification or
licensure.
Moreover, most trainings and even mediation courses rarely, if ever,
address the specific contexts in which mediation is actually practiced.1ss
They thus do not cover the multiplicity of challenges faced by low-income
mediation participants, such as low-wage work with variable hours and
little job security, child care, and the many problems endemic to
poverty.s6 This is troubling given the particular vulnerability of this
and "[i]t is usually a structured program designed to impart knowledge, skills, and abilities so
that a trainee will become competent in mediation.").
150. In learning theory, the two types of assessment are "formative," which enables a
student to engage in self-evaluation, and "summative," which is a more formal evaluation.
MARY J. ALLEN, ASSESSING ACADEMIC PROGRAMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 7-9 (2004).
151. Art Hinshaw & Roselle L. Wissler, How Do We Know That Mediation Training Works?,
12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 21 (2005) ("Studies that involve practicing mediators are more likely than
not to find that no relationship exists between mediator training and mediation outcomes.").
152. Maryland, for example, requires that a "basic mediation training program" includes,
among things, "information-gathering skills," "conflict management skills," and skills on how to
"identify and respond to power imbalances, intimidation, and the presence and effects of
domestic violence." MD. CODE ANN., MD Rules, supra note 146, § 17-104.
153. One jurisdiction that does examine and certify mediation training programs is
Virginia. VA. SUP. CT. GUIDELINES FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF MEDIATION TRAINING PROGRAMS (2011).
154. For a detailed discussion of the nature and risks of "bad" mediation, see supra text
accompanying notes 87-110.
155. Rubinson, Of Grids and Gatekeepers, upra note 23 at 894-97.
156. For an extended discussion of this issue, see Rubinson, Of Grids and Gatekeepers,
supra note 23, at 891-92.
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population to "bad" mediation.157
As to degree requirements, there is no reason to think that acquiring a
high school, college, or graduate degree correlates with the skills
necessary to be an effective mediator. Indeed, given that interpersonal
skills are crucial to successful mediation-an "emotional intelligence"
that is rarely the subject of academic assessment'58-it is plausible that
whatever degree an applicant has attained has little, if any, relationship
to the potential of an aspiring mediator to be an effective one.59 It
certainly does not relate to who might be a "bad" one.
B. Point of Entry Quality Control
Another standard element of professional quality control is passing
an examination before an applicant is licensed to practice.160 This is a
"point of entry" assessment because passage is typically the last hurdle
before a professional has authority to practice.161 Most professionals
have such an exam: physicians,162 accountants,163 psychologists,16 4 and, of
course, lawyers.165 For example, aspiring lawyers may have graduated
157. See supra text accompanying notes 135-47.
158. Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 1173, 1179 (1999) ("We value academic achievement in our culture, and yet it is such a
small part of what ultimately determines success in life."). The idea of "emotional intelligence"
is the result of Howard Gardner's influential ideas about "multiple intelligences." HOWARD
GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY IN PRACTICE 35 (1993); HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES
OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 11 (1983).
159. James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2
CLIN. L. REV. 457, 460 (1996) ("students who are empathic and diplomatic, who have well-
developed intuitions about others and accurately read non-verbal cues-students, to use the
current parlance, who have a high emotional intelligence, or 'EQ'-have a decided advantage in
a mediation clinic").
160. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE
1980s 25 (1983).
161. See, e.g., Anthony E. Davis, The New York Bar Examination: A Critical Appraisal, 48
N.Y. ST. B.J. 315, 315 (1976) (noting that the bar examination is the final hurdle before an
aspiring lawyer can practice).
162. Jayne W. Barnard & Mark Greenspan, Incremental Bar Admission: Lessons from the
Medical Profession, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 340, 342-45 (2003).
163. There is a "uniform CPA Examination." The Uniform CPA Examination, AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF CPAs, http://www.aicpa.org/BecomeACPA/CPAExam/Pages/CPAExam.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q8HG-JRZK].
164. For a review of psychological tests and licensing requirements by state, see Contact a
Licensing Board, Assoc. ST. & PROVINCIAL PSYCHOL. BOARDS,
http://www.asppb.net/?page=BdContactNewPG [https://perma.cc/BFA4-JH4T].
165. Written bar examinations became a requirement in most states by the 1890s.
STEVENS, supra note 160; see also Michael J. Thomas, The American Lawyer's Next Hurdle: The
State-Based Bar Examination System, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 235, 237-39 (2000) (tracing the history
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from college and an ABA accredited law school, as well as passed a
"character and fitness" assessment,166 yet the applicant still faces the
challenge of passing the bar examination.167 While some of these exams
have been criticized as discriminatory 68 and as not fully reflecting what
successful practice entails,169 there has been increasing sensitivity to
these issues, such as the addition of assessments that seek to better
reflect actual practice skills.170
In contrast, mediators do not need to pass a summative assessment
either through an exam or otherwise. In contrast to professions like law,
an applicant who has taken a required number of hours of training,
attained a specified degree, and fulfilled other statutory requirements is
"in." The applicant has gone through the hoops, and that is all that is
required.
C Ongoing Quality Control
Assuming that a mediator is duly qualified at "point of entry" by
fulfilling defined requirements, there are, at times, ongoing requirements
to ensure a mediator remains in good standing. The most common of
of state bar examinations).
166. The "character and fitness" review has generated substantial criticism for its
inherent subjectivity and inadequacies as a predictor of future misconduct See generally
Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 529 (1985).
167. This is a matter of continuing controversy. Bar passage rates are declining as of late.
New York, for example, recently had the lowest bar passage rate in eleven years. Mark Hansen,





168. Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the
Justifications for the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. L. REV. 1191, 1219-
20 (1995).
169. Id. at 1220; Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar Exam Box: A Proposal to
"MacCrate" Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L. REV. 343, 349-50 (2003) (describing a range of
critiques of the bar examination); Clark D. Cunningham, Rethinking the Licensing of New
Attorneys-An Exploration of Alternatives to the Bar Exam: Introduction, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. vii
(2004).
170. An example is the "Multistate Performance Test," which "is designed to test an
examinee's ability to use fundamental lawyering skills in a realistic situation." The Multistate
Performance Test, NAT'L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpt/
[https://perma.cc/E6TT-2PFZ] (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). Another example is "Step 2C" of the
United States Medical Licensing Examination, which is a "hands-on" assessment of a
"candidate's ability to gather information from patients and communicate medical findings to
them." Barnard & Greenspan, supra note 162, at 345.
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these requirements, as with other professions,171 is for continuing
professional education. Continuing education seeks to educate
practitioners about current developments or specific aspects of
practice.172 As with pre-qualification trainings, however, the quality of
such programs remains largely unexamined: there might be evaluations,
but there is no assurance about what is done with them. It is, as with
other requirements, a matter of "checking it off."
Some jurisdictions recognize the shortcomings of continuing
education requirements, and thus, require more.173 These typically
involve critique and feedback by experienced mediators of the
performance of mediators either in simulations or in actual
mediations.174 While sophisticated models and protocols to conduct such
assessments have been developed'7s and no doubt most observers are
skilled and well-suited to the task, as with trainers or instructors in
continuing education, there may be little, if any, assurance that this is the
case.
D. Identifying and Penalizing Wrongdoing
All of the quality control mechanisms discussed thus far are
preventative- that is, they are designed to develop and, with continuing
education, maintain competence and avoid "bad" practice. Most
professions, however, have implemented public and private mechanisms
that, at least in theory, identify and impose some sort of a penalty for
specific wrongdoing.176 This is the most narrowly tailored form of quality
control: it identifies wrongdoing that has already happened rather than
seeking to prevent wrongdoing that might happen. There are a range of
171. Rocio T. Aliaga, Framing the Debate on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE): The District of Columbia Bar's Consideration of MCLE, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1145, 1153-
63 (1995) (assessing the argument that MCLE leads to competent lawyers).
172. Marzine Harges, supra note 62, at 709 (noting that continuing education
requirements are designed to "keep professional mediators abreast of the latest mediation
developments").
173. Aliaga, supra note 171, at 1152.
174. An extensive and sophisticated program has been developed by, among others,
Robert A. Baruch Bush-one of the founders of transformative mediation. Dorothy J. Della Noce
et al., Signposts and Crossroads: A Model for Live Action Mediator Assessment, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 197, 200 (2008). While the focus of this effort is, unsurprisingly, transformative
mediation, the authors do recognize that "the basic concept" of the model they have developed
"is applicable to other forms of practice" of mediation. Id. at 222.
175. See Della Noce et al., Signposts and Crossroads, upra note 174.




mechanisms that seek to serve this function in mediation. None of them
work very well.
One such mechanism is a lawsuit for professional malpractice.177
With mediation, while theoretically possible, data shows that lawsuits
against mediators for malpractice are exceptionally rare and are virtually
never successful.178
Another possible mechanism is judicial review of mediated
agreements due to a claim that the agreement was due to mediator
misconduct.179 Courts, on very rare occasions, have issued written
opinions on this point, and these opinions are procedural: they address
the degree to which the virtually absolute confidentiality protections in
mediation should give way when one participant alleges mediator
misconduct.180 Some of these allegations can be eye-opening in terms of
their severity and gross violation of virtually all norms of mediation.181
Nevertheless, even if a court does conclude through an evidentiary
hearing that allegations of mediator wrongdoing are true, it is the
litigants who experience the consequences; there are no formalized
consequences to the mediator. The finding might lead to a kind of
professional shaming, or, of greater consequence, a reluctance or refusal
by a judge or court personnel to choose that mediator from a mediation
roster should one exist. These, however, are possible consequences; they
are not mandated ones.
Most importantly, a core characteristic of most professional
regulation-except mediation-is a mechanism that seeks to identify and
punish practitioner misconduct. While such misconduct would trigger a
range of sanctions, the most severe is revocation of the ability to engage
in the profession. This sanction is typically imposed for substantial
misconduct: lawyers who commingle client funds,182 psychologists who
engage in sexual relationships with patients,183 or who charge fees that
177. Id at 206 (discussing malpractice suits against "all professionals").
178. Moffitt, Suing Mediators, supra note 71.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 183-88.
180. Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
that a "court may invoke its inherent power to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and
its processes by invalidating a court-ordered mediation settlement agreement obtained
through violation and abuse of the judicially prescribed mediation procedures").
181. See supra text accompanying notes 92-101.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.15 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2016).
183. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES PSYCHOLOGISTS & CODE CONDUCT r. 10.05 (AM. PSYCHOL. AsS'N 2010)
(prohibiting "sexual intimacies with current therapy clients/patients"); ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
PSYCHOLOGISTS & CODE CONDUCT r. 10.08 (AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N 2010) (prohibiting sexual intimacies
with former therapy clients/patients").
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are excessive or fraudulent.184 Virtually all professional codes also have a
"catch all" provision that prohibits general fraudulent or criminal
activity,185 which may or may not include wrongdoing that is apart from
the provision of professional services.
In conjunction with any disciplinary process, there must be a
mechanism that triggers it. One way is through complaints submitted by
patients or clients. Another way is through actions that are monitored or
easily discoverable by a professional authority, such as failure to attend
continuing professional education programs, payment of membership
fees, appropriate maintenance of back accounts, or criminal activity.186
Mediation, outside of court mediators, has no such triggering
mechanism because there is no binding authority to review a
complaint.87 This can be startling when, for example, an attorney who is
disbarred or a psychologist whose license has been suspended continues
or starts to mediate.188  Some states, in relation to court-annexed
programs,89 do have complaint procedures, some of which are quite
detailed,190 but they reflect little or no recognition of the challenges facing
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2016) (setting forth mandatory
requirements regarding notice and nature of fees).
185. For example, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 prohibits conduct
involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
8.4 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2016). This Rule is not limited to such actions which are undertaken as part
of the provision of professional services. Id
186. Lawyers, for example, must maintain "attorney trust accounts" into which the lawyer
must deposit funds that are still the property of clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.15
(AM. BAR. Ass'N 2016). Maintenance of these accounts are subject to detailed requirements.
Maryland, for example, has a separate chapter in its Rule, which includes twelve separate
sections, which detail the many requirements regarding such accounts. MD. CODE ANN., MD
Rules, supra note 146 (Chapter 600 on attorney trust accounts.).
187. Hinshaw, Regulating Mediators, supra note 6, at 176-77.
188. Id. at 164-67 (2016). For more detail regarding the conduct of this mediator, see
supra text accompanying note 101.
189. See e.g., FLA. RULE 10.700 et. seq.; MD. R. PROC. D. 17-205(a)(7); VA. SUP. CT.,
PROCEDURES FOR COMPLAINTS AGAINST CERTIFIED MEDIATORS, MEDIATION TRAINERS, AND MEDIATION
MENTORS (2011) available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/forms/adrO04
proc.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PBN-TGVX]; N.C. COURT SYSTEM, COMPLAINTS AGAINST MEDIATORS,
COMPLAINT PROCESS, available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Complaints/Default.asp
[https://perma.cc/5U3F-5BCU]; GA. COMM'N DISP. RESOL., ETHICS PROCEDURES Appendix C § II,
http://godr.org/sites/default/files/Godr/supremecourtadr rules/CURRENT%20ADR%20RU
LES%20COMPLETE%205-28-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL32-L45W] (same).
190. See, e.g., FLA 10.810-10.830 (detailing a mediator complaint process); GA. COMM'N




low-income mediation participants. In any event, the degree to which
these processes have been successful is open to question. In Minnesota,
for example, which does have a detailed grievance process,191 only seven
mediators have been publicly reprimanded over a ten-year period.192
V. A PROPOSAL FOR SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT WITH TEETH
While there are challenges in identifying and minimizing "bad"
mediation in court-annexed mediation, the following is a preliminary
effort at a multi-layered proposal. The goal is to suggest a holistic
approach that, collectively, might gain some traction in addressing an
otherwise intractable problem. The most robust approaches begin with
the point of entry stage - the time when anticipations of competence
resolve into demonstrations of competence.
A. Establish a Diverse Panel of Mediation Examiners
If there is to be a meaningful point-of-entry mechanism, there needs
to be a meaningful assessment tool. Admittedly, a written exam might be
ill-suited to this task given the fluidity and openness that is a hallmark of
mediation 93 and the mediation community's justifiable rejection of
formalized "rules" that can be memorized and tested.194 Nevertheless,
there needs to be a board or roster to engage in meaningful assessment of
aspiring mediators. What is particularly important is that the board
should be reflective of and sensitive to the plight of low-income
mediation participants. There are a number of ways to do this.
First, the board should be diverse. This is certainly true in the
LES%20COMPLETE%205-28-2014.pdf[https://perma.cc/3BE8-FZB2] (same).
191. For an overview of the Minnesota Mediation Ethics Board, see Yang, supra note 64, at
1245. For details about the complaint process, see MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/assets/documents/O/public/AlternativeDisp
uteResolution/Complaint-flowchart.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XYU-QMPC].
192. MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scaolibrary/Sanctions to-theADRReviewB
oard_-_05-21-_updates_.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA32-2VUN]; see also Young, supra note 96, at
775 ("Of the nearly 9,000 mediators regulated by the states analyzed in this article, less than
100 mediators have received any type of sanction, remedial recommendation, or intervention
for conduct inconsistent with ethical standards.").
193. Brian Jarrett, The Future of Mediation: A Sociological Perspective 2009 J. DisP. RESOL.
49, 57 (2009) (referring to mediation as "fluid and evolving practice").
194. Lon Fuller called such rules "formal prescriptions laid down in advance"-a way of
conceptualizing what law is. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
305, 325-26 (1971). Fuller considered such proscriptions to be an "encumbrance" in some
instances, hence one of the advantages of mediation. Id.
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traditional sense of "diversity"-gender, race, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, and so on. There are other kinds of diversity, however, that
are unique to mediation. One kind of diversity is to insure there are
adherents of different styles of mediation in order to avoid the board
becoming a locus of this debate.195 The board, then, should include self-
identified transformative, facilitative, and evaluative mediators. In
addition, the interdisciplinary nature of mediation should be taken into
account.196  Perhaps most importantly, the diversity should include
members who have particular expertise in mediation involving low-
income mediation participants or come from a low-income background
themselves.197 A well-heeled business or family mediator might assume
that the resources available to participants in those types of mediations-
substantial time (including the availability of multiple sessions), the
retention of counsel, the ability to retain different professionals (such as
accountants or psychologists) to assist in the mediation-are available to
all.198
The form of the board should also avoid the "capture" of the
evaluation process by those who employ it-that is, judges and the
judiciary. Thus, some members of the board should be independent even
when the board, as might often be the case, is administratively under the
aegis of the courts.199 This is crucial. As noted above, the interests of the
judiciary-the "speedy" and "efficient" resolution of cases-cannot
sacrifice the quality of the process.200 There is also the possibility that
judges who, by temperament and training, often approach mediation
from a litigation mindset, will not recognize mediation that is damaging
195. See supra text accompanying notes 19-39.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
197. An example of an organization that would be suitable is "Community Mediation" in
Maryland, which provides free mediation services on a range of matters, including
neighborhood, family, and school dispute. COMMUNITY MEDIATION,
http://communitymediation.org/mediation-other-services/types-of-mediation/
[https://perma.cc/ZE26-6NS9].
198. Human cognition assumes the normativity of our own experience. JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 337-38 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For another
classic text that explores cognitive shortcuts, see RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
199. Some jurisdictions have done this, including for example, Minnesota. Although its
"ADR Ethics Board" is under the aegis of the Minnesota judicial Branch, its fifteen-member
board includes nine "non-judicial" appointees. ADR Ethics Board, January 2017, MINNESOTA
JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/scao_1ibrary/ADR/Roster-
January-2017-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/268J-6CDA].




Finally, there should be panels of at least three "examiners" whose
assessment can be "blind," perhaps through viewing a video of the
mediation.202 Each would not know who else is doing the observing. This
would help prevent the risk that the judgment of a single examiner,
whose style or judgment might not match that of the candidate, would
overly influence the assessment process.
B. Develop Evaluation Forms for All Attendees at a Mediation
All attendees at every mediation-participants, attorneys, and
observers-should be required to complete a confidential evaluation
form to be submitted to the board. The number or seriousness of
negative comments can trigger further investigation. This mechanism
can, if implemented appropriately, act as one means to identify bad
mediators without the need for a complaint to be filed. Such a
mechanism is particularly important given that many participants-
especially low-income participants who see the process as "official"-
might feel reluctant submitting a formal complaint even if it is deemed
confidential.
In crafting such a form, it would be especially important to recognize
the distinct obstacles in gathering data from unrepresented litigants. As
already discussed,203 litigants in court-annexed contexts might have
limited or no knowledge of what mediation is or should be. One way to
address this challenge is through questions that are more descriptive
than evaluative. In other words, broadly framed "are you satisfied"
questions might not be particularly informative. In contrast, questions
about specific acts by the mediator, or how the participant viewed the
mediator's role in the mediation, would be more likely to gather relevant
information.
Moreover, any form must take into account that litigants in a court-
annexed process might understand little or no English or face problems
with literacy. Reaching this population is more important than just some
general sense of being comprehensive in gathering information. In fact,
201. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 670 (1986) ("There is... no obvious match between the characteristics that make for
excellent judging and the skills required for successful mediation."). One scholar characterized
the increasing numbers of judges and attorneys who mediate as "the end of good mediation."
Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out, supra note 20.
202. Della Noce et al., Signposts and Crossroads, upra note 175, at 203, 221.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 102-11.
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these litigants might be particularly vulnerable and at risk of
participating in bad mediation, so their feedback is especially important.
Finally, participants who are immigrants might fear deportation or a
change in status when they do anything that might open them up to
scrutiny by immigration authorities.204 There is no easy answer to this,
although assurances about the confidentiality of process and not asking
about citizenship status might make these participants more comfortable.
C. Construct a Robust Grievance Proceeding
A meaningful grievance process is not easily done, although some
states have given it a try.205 It must be developed in light of mediation
being an interdisciplinary, confidential, and varied process. Some sort of
disciplinary process is not only a basis for limiting who may practice a
profession;206 it also must be in place to investigate the possibility of bad
mediation.
Having a meaningful grievance process for mediators has been the
subject of inquiry, and there have been detailed and well thought-out
proposals on how to establish such a process.20 7 As with evaluation
forms, it is crucial to approach crafting and implementing this process
with special sensitivity to the needs and circumstances of a low-income
population, including issues of language, availability for investigations,
and concern among immigrants or others about becoming embroiled in
"official" proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mediation can be, and often is, a remarkably productive and effective
way to resolve disputes. Risks remain, however, particularly for low-
income litigants mediating in court-annexed programs. Challenges
multiply in light of the lack of unified professional identity that is
characteristic of other professions, the absence of meaningful ethical
rules, and the rigorous confidentiality protections given to mediation
204. See generally Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2013).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 192-95.
206. Polelle, supra note 176 ("In return for providing professions with special
privileges... society rightfully demands" that a profession "vigorously polic[es] its own
members for fiduciary violations of express codes of ethics.").
207. For examples, see Young, supra note 96; Della Noce et al., Signposts and Crossroads,
supra note 175; Performance-Based Assessment: A Methodology, for use in selecting, training, and
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proceedings.
A crucial goal, then, is to extend the benefits of mediation as widely as
possible while minimizing the rare, but still real, examples of mediation
that is harmful to litigants. As with any profession, "bad" practitioners
will always exist. The difference is that mediation has virtually no means
to identify and discipline such practitioners. Given that the work of
mediators is not otherwise subject to scrutiny, with no affirmative
"product" to assess and with participants who might not know what
mediators are supposed to do, it is crucial to take steps to insure, as much
as possible, that those most vulnerable to bad mediation will not
encounter it.
